Taxation—Equitable Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax on Non-Probate Property, Carpenter v. Carpenter, 267 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 1954) by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1955 Issue 1 
January 1955 
Taxation—Equitable Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax on Non-
Probate Property, Carpenter v. Carpenter, 267 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 
1954) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Taxation—Equitable Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax on Non-Probate Property, Carpenter v. 
Carpenter, 267 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 1954), 1955 WASH. U. L. Q. 89 (1955). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss1/11 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENTS
the distinction drawn between "some evidence" and evidence sufficient
to establish a reasonable doubt does not seem realistic or practicable,
the general rule that the state must establish mental responsibility
beyond a reasonable doubt is sound in that it is consistent with the
usual rules of criminal procedure which require the prosecution to
prove all elements of its case.'
Theoretically, both in the District of Columbia, and in New Hamp-
shire,2' the prosecution has a most difficult task in obtaining a con-
viction as a result of the combination of rules that those jurisdictions
have adopted in regard to an accused's sanity and the procedure by
which it is proved: the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the unlawful act of the defendant was not the product of
a mental disease or defect. As a practical matter, however, although
it would seem that these rules will induce defendants to plead insanity
more often and thereby increase the task of the prosecution, it is
doubtful whether any serious increase in the number of verdicts for
the defendant by reason of insanity will result because of a reluctance
of juries to find an accused insane if he has committed a crime which
arouses moral indignation.?
TAXATION-EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX ON
NON-PROBATE PROPERTY
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 267 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 1954)
Decedent left property under a will naming his widow and two sons
residuary legatees. He also left a sizeable non-probate estate con-
sisting of an annuity contract "death benefit" payable to his widow
monthly for twenty years, with his two sons as contingent beneficia-
ries.' The widow, as executrix, charged the federal estate tax2 upon
25. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790, 802 (1952).
26. See note 17 supra.
27. See ZmBooORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT
56-68 (1954). Dr. Zilboorg refers to several cases in which the defendant would
appear to have been insane at the time of the act yet was found sane by thejury. But see also ROYAL COMWNIISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953
REPOaR 106 (1953), where witnesses reported that even the "irresistible impulse"
test had resulted in an increase in the number of verdicts of not guilty by reason
of insanity.
1. The annuity would have paid the decedent monthly amounts for life begin-
ning at age seventy; when he died at sixty-seven an alternative clause made the
principal of $128,000 payable to his widow over a twenty-year period. Calculated
upon an actuarial basis, the interest of decedent's sons in the annuity benefit was
approximately $3,000 each, yet on the basis of the widow's settlement each would
have been compelled to pay $7,000 from his share of the residuary estate as
one-third of the tax upon the entire benefit.
2. 26 U.S.C. §§ 800-939 (1952). Although there have been no decisions on
this point under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, it is believed that the effect
of the law is unchanged, since Chapter 11 (§§ 2001-2207) of the new code con-
tinues the basic provisions of the estate tax in materially unaltered form.
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the death benefit against the residuary legacy. This, in effect, forced
the sons to share this tax burden equally with the widow, although
her share of the benefit was much greater than theirs. The sons
challenged her final settlement as executrix, contending that the
federal estate tax should have been equitably apportioned among those
benefiting from the annuity contract. The Missouri Supreme Court,
deciding the question for the first time in Missouri, ruled in favor of
equitable apportionment of the estate tax burden and required each
beneficiary to pay a pro rata share of the estate tax on the annuity
contract.3
While the federal estate tax statute' provides that a testator may
direct where the tax burden is to fall,s it is silent as to which part of
the estate must bear the tax in the absence of such expressed intention
of the testator. During an initial period of confusion lasting until
1942, virtually all state courts felt bound by the federal act to take
the entire amount of the tax from the residuary estate.4 In 1942,
however, the United States Supreme Court upheld a state statute
which directed that, in the absence of the decedent's expressed intent,
the tax should be apportioned among all persons benefiting from the
estate.7 Since that decision, it has generally been recognized that
state law is determinative as to where the tax burden is to fall.,
At present, fourteen states have statutes directing that, in the ab-
sence of express direction by the deceased, federal estate taxes upon
non-probate property shall be equitably apportioned among those ben-
efiting from the estate.9 Only one state, on the other hand, provides by
3. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 267 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 1954).
4. INr. REV. CODE of 1954 §§ 2001-2207. The original estate tax act is to be
found in 39 STAT. 777 (1916).
5. INT. Rv. CODE of 1954 § 2205. See YMCA of Columbus, Ohio v. Davis,
264 U.S. 47 (1924), construing the corresponding section of the then extant
federal code.
6. Many of the state courts relied upon YMCA of Columbus, Ohio v. Davis,
264 U.S. 47 (1924), as holding that the federal act directed that the residue
bear the tax burden in the absence of the testator's direction. See, for example,
Judge Cardozo's opinion in Matter of Oakes, 248 N.Y. 280, 283, 162 N.E. 79, 80
(1928) ; Karch, The Apportionment of Death Taxes, 54 HARv. L. REV. 10, 22
(1940). Actually, however, the YMCA case did nothing more than to affirm
that Ohio might place the tax burden upon probate property on the residuary
estate. This was recognized by some writers. See, e.g., 1 PAuL, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION § 13.54 (1942), which anticipated the holding in Riggs v.
Del Drago, infra note 7. See Note, 40 COL. L. REv. 690 (1940).
7. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942), overruling In re Del Drago's
Estate, 287 N.Y. 61, 38 N.E.2d 131 (1941), which had held that, since the federal
act provided for the payment of the tax from the residue, section 124 of the New
York Decedent Estate Law, which directed apportionment, was unconstitutional
because in conflict with federal law.
8. Although no courts at present flatly assert that the federal act requires
that the residuary estate bear the tax load, nevertheless, recent decisions have
unqualifiedly approved cases whose basis is this very misconception. See Seattle-
First Nat. Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696. 203 P.2d 1078 (1949).
9. ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 150 (1947); CAi. PROB. CODE ANN. § 970 (1944);
CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 2076 (1949); DEL. CODE. ANN. C. 12, § 2901 (1953);
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statute that the residue shall bear the tax burden. ° Where the matter
has been judicially determined, courts in seven states have ruled in
favor of apportionment of the tax burden on non-probate property,2
while courts in six states apparently have held that the residuary
estate is to bear the burden of the tax on non-probate property. 2
Judicial decisions which have placed the burden of the estate tax
upon non-probate property on the residue are based in large measure
upon prior decisions made during the years when it was felt that the
correct interpretation of the federal statute required that the residue
bear the thrust of the federal tax burden.3 By differentiating between
the federal estate tax, which is a tax upon the right of the decedent to
transfer property after death and is payable from the estate by the
executor,4 and an inheritance tax, which is a tax upon the right of
the beneficiary to receive the property of the decedent and therefore
is properly payable by the beneficiary, 2 courts which have placed
the burden upon the residue have concluded that Congress meant for
the estate tax to be taken from the residuary estate and not from
the beneficiaries of the non-probate estate.6 Such courts have also
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 734.041 (Supp. 1953); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 81, §
161(2) (1951); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 65A, § 5 (1953); NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2108
(Cum. Supp. 1953); N.H. Laws 1947, c. 102; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3A:25-31, 3A:
25-33 (1953); N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 124; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 844(1950); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8350.7 (Williams Supp. 1952); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-
151 (Supp. 1954). Maine passed an apportionment statute in 1945 (Me. Laws
1945, c. 269, § 39-A), but repealed it two years later (Me. Laws 1947, c. 220, § 1).
For judicial decisions under statutes, see Note, 37 A.L.R.2d 199 (1954).
10. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 449(1) (Supp. 1953).
11. Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Bloomington, 121 Ind. App. 136,
96 N.E.2d 918 (1951), rehearing denied, 98 N.E.2d 231 (1951); Louisville Trust
Co. v. Walter, 306 Ky. 756, 207 S.W.2d 328 (1948); Succession of Ratcliff, 212
La. 563, 33 So.2d 114 (1947); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 267 S.W.2d 632 (Mo.
1954); In re Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112, 255 P.2d 317 (1953); McDougall v.
Central Nat. Bank of Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 45, 109 N.E.2d 441 (1952); Indus-
trial Trust Co. v. Budlong, 77 R.I. 428, 76 A.2d 600 (1950). See Note 37 A.L.R.2d
169 (1954).
12. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Hart, 383 Ill. 489, 50 N.E.2d 461 (1943);
Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144 Kan. 79, 58 P.2d 469 (1936); First Nat. Bank
of Miami v. First Trust Co. of St. Paul, 64 N.W.2d 524 (Minn. 1954); Buffaloe
v. Barnes, 226 N.C. 313, 38 S.E.2d 222 (1946); In re O'Shea's Estate, 176 Ore.
500, 159 P.2d 198 (1945); In re Williamson's Estate, 38 Wash. 2d 359, 229 P.2d
312 (1951).
13. See Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Bloomington, 121 Ind. App.
136, 156, 96 N.E.2d 918, 927 (1951), where the court, after reviewing cases
which placed the tax burden upon the residuary estate, concluded that they were
based upon a misconception of the federal act. See note 8 supra.
14. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6018(a) places upon the executor the duty to
make estate tax returns for both probate and non-probate property.
15. The distinction between estate and inheritance taxes has been pointed out
many times by the United States Supreme Court. See Riggs v. Del Drago, 317
U.S. 95, 97 (1942); Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929);
Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61, 62 (1924); YMCA of Columbus, Ohio v. Davis,
264 U.S. 47, 50 (1924); 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION § 1.05
(1942).
16. Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923); Amoskeag Trust
Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 200 At]. 786 (1938); In re
Williamson's Estate, 38 Wash. 2d 359, 229 P.2d 312 (1951). Other courts, point-
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pointed out that the federal estate tax statute provides for apportion-
ment in two cases, notably those involving life insurance beneficiaries1
and-those involving persons in whose favor the decedent had exercised
a power of appointment. 8 Applying the exclusio alterius maxim of
statutory construction, these courts have held that Congress must
have intended that there should be no other apportionment, and
therefore all other tax upon property in the taxable estate must be
taken from the residue.2 9 Further, although recognizing that it is a
rather tenuous basis for decision, some cases have suggested that the
decedent intends non-probate donees to enjoy the full benefits be-
stowed upon them, and to require such donees to pay a pro rata share
of the estate tax would be in violation of the decedent's intention.2 0 The
same cases have hesitantly advanced the idea that since the decedent
is presumed to have known that the law required that the residue bear
the tax burden in the event of his silence, such silence must be taken
as an intention that the residue is to bear the burden.21
Judicial decisions which apportion the tax equitably among those
persons receiving non-probate benefits from the estate are based
primarily upon the idea that equity and good conscience compel such
an apportionment.22 Although early estate tax rates were low and
could usually be paid from the residue without great injury to the
residuary legatees, in recent years the tax has assumed such propor-
tions that, if laid solely upon the residue, it is quite likely not only to
exhaust the residue, but also to force an abatement of specific legacies
in order that the tax may be paid.2 Further, it is said that all too
often the residuary legatees are members of the immediate family of
ing out the same distinction, have ruled that the federal estate tax is a charge
against the estate, and by state law must be borne by the residue as a cost of
administration. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Hart, 383 I1. 489, 50 N.E.2d 461
(1943); in e O'Shea's Estate, 176 Ore. 500, 159 P.2d 198 (1945); Thompson v.
Thompson, 149 Tex. 632, 236 S.W.2d 779 (1951).
Although many early cases in Massachusetts, New York, and other states
have been nullified by subsequent statutory enactments, courts in other jurisdic-
tions have continued to rely upon those early cases as stating the basis for
burdening the residuary estate. See notes .9-12 supra for the present state of
the law.
17. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 2206.
18. Id. at § 2207.
19. Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923); see Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 488, 497, 144 N.E. 769, 772 (1924), cert.
denied, 266 U.S. 633 (1925).
20. See Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144 Kan. 79, 81, 59 P.2d 469, 470 (1936);
Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 474, 200 Atl.
786, 788 (1938) ; Newton's Estate, 74 Pa. Super. 361, 368 (1920).
2L See note 20 supra.
22. See note 11 supra, particularly Carpenter v. Carpaster, 267 S.W.2d 632
(Mo. 1954).
23. See I PAuL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G1FT TAxATI0. § 13.54 (Supp. 1946). An
extreme example of this is found in In re Mellon's Estate, 347 Pa. 520, 32 A.2d 749(1943), where the probate property amounted to some eleven million dollars, but
due to the inclusion in the gross estate of inter-vivos gifts, the federal estate tax
amounted to nearly forty million dolLrs.
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the testator, while donees of non-probate property are less closely
related, and that the effect of depleting the residue is to allow stran-
gers to take free of taxation at the cost of forcing the widow and
children to pay the tax upon property which is of no benefit to them"2
The rule adopted by the principal case that, in the absence of direc-
tion by the decedent, the federal estate tax upon non-probate property
should be borne proportionately by the donees of that property, and
should not be levied upon the residuary legacy, is much to be pre-
ferred over a rule depleting the benefits of the residuary legatees in
order to allow a non-probate donee to escape the heavy burden of
federal estate taxation. The United States Supreme Court, by point-
ing out that the federal statute is silent as to where the tax burden
shall fall,15 has destroyed any potency which the argument for forcing
the tax load upon the residue may ever have had. The failure of those
states burdening the residue to re-examine their rule in the light of
judicial development and the advent of heavier taxes upon the estate
is without justification.- Clearly, the Missouri Supreme Court reached
a proper decision in apportioning the federal estate tax equitably
among those benefiting from the non-probate estate.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE--SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR TO HUSBAND BY
SALOONKEEPER AFTER PROHIBITORY NOTICE BY WIE
Cole v. Rush, 271 P.2d 47 (Cai.1954)
Deceased's widow and minor children brought an action against
defendant saloonkeeper to recover for the loss of decedent's comfort
and support occasioned by his wrongful death. The complaint alleged
defendant knew deceased was pugnacious when intoxicated and had
been requested by the widow not to sell liquor to the deceased in suffi-
cient quantity to allow him to become intoxicated, but that defendant
refused to comply with this request. The complaint further alleged
that deceased became inebriated after drinking liquor sold to him by
the defendant and that deceased then engaged in a fight with another
person, during which the deceased suffered injuries resulting in his
immediate death. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the corn-
plaint. The Supreme Court of California, reversing that judgment,
held that the surviving spouse and children of a decedent have a cause
of action against a saloonkeeper who, with notice, sells alcoholic bev-
erages to a husband causing him to become intoxicated, from which
24. See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIrT TAXATION § 13.54 (1942).
25. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
26. As to the argument for levying the estate tax upon probate assets against
the residuary estate, while continuing to tax non-probate beneficiaries propor-
tionately, see Comment, 31 B.U.L. REv. 233 (1951).
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